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Climate policy in EU Member States is be-
coming increasingly crowded. Multiple in-
struments have been introduced at both the
Member State and EU levels and new in-
struments are regularly being proposed. As
the number of instruments grows, so does
the potential for interaction between them.
This interaction can be complementary and
mutually reinforcing, but there is also the
risk that different policy instruments will
interfere with one another and undermine
the objectives and credibility of each. The
central aim of the EU-funded research proj-
ect “Interaction in EU Climate Policy”
(INTERACT) has been to develop a system-
atic approach to analysing policy interac-
tion and to use this approach to explore the
potential interactions between the proposed
EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS)
and other instruments within both EU and
Member State climate policy.1
1 The INTERACT project
The INTERACT project was conducted over a
two-year period between March 2001 and
March 2003. The project was co-ordinated by
SPRU (Science and Technology Policy Re-
search) at the University of Sussex (UK), in
collaboration with: the Energy Research Centre
of the Netherlands (ECN), the Fraunhofer In-
stitute for Systems and Innovation Research
(ISI), the Centre International de Recherche sur
l’Environnement et le Développement (CIRED),
and the Energy Policy Group (EPG) at the Na-
tional and Kapodistrian University of Athens
(NKUA). SPRU was responsible for the overall
direction of the project, while each Partner was
primarily responsible for empirical research
within their own Member State. The Partner
institutes in each participating Member State
selected a minimum of three national climate
policy instruments, examined their potential
interactions with the EU ETS and developed a
number of policy recommendations. Table 1
summarises the general categories under which
the selected instruments fell. Note that there is
frequently more than one instrument within
each general category.2
Table 1: Types of policy instruments examined
in each case study
Category UK Nether-lands
Ger-
many France Greece
Carbon/energy
taxes   
Negotiated
agreements    
Support mecha-
nisms for renew-
able electricity
    
Industrial pollu-
tion control   
GHG emissions
trading  
Promotion of
energy efficiency 
2 Implications of the EU ETS for Policy
Interaction
A defining feature of a “cap and trade” emis-
sions trading scheme – such as the EU ETS – is
that, assuming adequate enforcement and full
compliance, there is certainty that total emis-
sions will be equal to the aggregate cap.3 A sec-
ond feature of a cap and trade scheme is that,
under a standard set of assumptions regarding
the competitive operation of the allowance mar-
ket, the trading scheme will allow the target to
be met at least cost. In the equilibrium, marginal
abatement costs will be equalised across sources
and equal to the allowance price.
These idealised features of an ETS have
important implications for policy interaction.
Coupled with comparable assumptions regard-
ing the idealised operation of the relevant
product markets, they imply that the use of a
second instrument that directly or indirectly
interacts with the ETS will increase the overall
costs of meeting the emissions cap while at the
same time having no influence on environ-
mental effectiveness – where the latter is de-
fined as assurance in meeting the ETS cap. The
aggregate abatement costs of ETS participants
may be either increased (e.g. by a carbon tax)
or reduced (e.g. by a subsidy scheme) by the
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second instrument, but in all cases the aggre-
gate social costs of meeting the cap will be
increased and participant emissions will con-
tinue to be less than or equal to the cap. This
result applies both to instruments which di-
rectly affect CO2 emissions from ETS partici-
pants, such as a carbon tax on fuel use, and to
instruments which indirectly affect those emis-
sions, such as a tax on electricity consumption
of both participants and non-participants.
In practice, allowance and product mar-
kets may only approximate the theoretical
ideal. Market failures will be pervasive in both
markets and the political bargaining that led to
the ETS cap is unlikely to provide an adequate
reflection of the “social optimum” for carbon
externalities (to the extent that such a concept
is meaningful for global climate change). In
addition, governments have objectives which
go beyond efficiency, such as the promotion of
social equity. In these circumstances, there may
be legitimate grounds for introducing or main-
taining other climate policy instruments that
directly or indirectly interact with the ETS.
These include:
- improving the static efficiency of the ETS
by overcoming market failures other than
CO2 externalities that inhibit the adoption of
energy efficiency technologies;
- improving the dynamic efficiency of the
ETS by overcoming market failures in the
area of technology innovation and diffusion;
- delivering social objectives other than effi-
ciency, such as equity and political feasibil-
ity; and
- compensating for deficiencies in the ETS
design such as mitigating allowance price
uncertainty.
However, the fact that positive combinations
between an ETS and other instruments are
theoretically possible does not mean that such
combinations will result when an ETS is intro-
duced into an existing policy mix. Furthermore,
when an ETS is in place, aggregate emission
reductions will be set solely by the ETS cap.
Instruments which target emissions covered by
the ETS cap will contribute nothing further to
emission reductions – unless they are suffi-
ciently stringent that they make the ETS re-
dundant. This means that, once the ETS is in
place, the justification for maintaining such
instruments must rely upon one of the above
rationales, rather than the contribution of the
instrument to overall emission reductions.
In the following, an example of the possi-
ble interaction between the EU ETS and volun-
tary or “negotiated agreements” (cf. Table 1) in
the Netherlands is outlined.
3 Case study: the interaction between the
EU ETS and the Benchmarking Covenant
in the Netherlands
The Benchmarking Covenant (BC) is a volun-
tary agreement, signed in July 1999 by the
Dutch government and energy-intensive indus-
try, including the electricity production sector.
The central goal of the Benchmarking Cove-
nant is to reduce GHG emissions from energy-
intensive industries by improving their energy
efficiency without compromising the interna-
tional competitiveness of these industries. Ac-
cording to the BC, participating industries are
required to become close to the world best
practice in terms of energy efficiency as soon
as possible, but no later than 2012. The inter-
action between the EU ETS and the BC raises a
variety of issues, including:
 The impact of the EU ETS on electricity
prices. The EU ETS may have a significant
impact on the price of electricity, which, in
turn, may have a significant, although op-
posing impact on the two major sectors
covered by the Benchmarking Covenant, i.e.
the power producers versus energy-inten-
sive industries. Emissions trading at an al-
lowance price of €10/tCO2 may lead to an
increase of the electricity price in 2010 by
0.42 €cent/kWh. Based on a commodity or
producer cost price of 2.7 €cent/kWh before
emissions trading, this implies an increase
of that price of some 15 percent due to the
EU ETS. If the EU ETS will indeed result in
an increase in average electricity prices of
0.42 €cent/kWh, it will have a significant
impact on the two major sectors covered by
the Benchmarking Covenant. In case of free
allocation of allowances, more than €400
million of economic rent will accrue to the
power sector, while energy intensive indus-
tries that compete on global markets will
not be able to pass on increases in electricity
prices to their customers. As a result, the
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output of these industries may decline when
the electricity price is raised.
 The Benchmarking Covenant as a basis for
allocating EU ETS allowances. A major
interaction issue concerns the question of
whether the BC could be used as a basis for
allocating EU ETS allowances. The advan-
tages of such an approach are that it fits
well with the existing climate policies in the
Netherlands, it would meet several of the
allocation criteria specified in Annex III of
the EU ETS Directive, and that it increases
the political acceptability of the EU ETS
among the participants of the BC. However,
allocation of allowances based on the
Benchmarking Covenant is likely to imply
that the socio-economic benefits of emis-
sions trading in the Netherlands will be
relatively low. Moreover, the conversion of
energy efficiency benchmarks into CO2
emission quotas raises a variety of practical
implementation issues which may lead to
high information and transaction costs.
Overall, in a multi-criteria assessment, the
coexistence of the EU ETS and the BC, no-
tably when the allocation of the emission
allowances is based on the BC, scores rela-
tively high in terms of industrial competi-
tiveness and political acceptability, but
relatively low in terms of economic effi-
ciency and administrative simplicity.
4 Policy recommendations
The INTERACT project has made a number of
specific policy recommendations for each of the
participating Member States. These recommen-
dations vary according to the specific circum-
stances of the Member State and the interpreta-
tions given by each of the research teams. But
the following general principles of climate pol-
icy development may be highlighted:
- Goals: The development of policy options
should be based upon clear principles and
long-term goals. For climate policy, a stable
and effective policy framework is required
during the Kyoto commitment period. This
means that policy should be developed by
working back from where we want to be in
2008, rather than developing short-term ex-
pedients.
- Carbon pricing: Energy users in all sectors
should pay for carbon emissions, whether
through taxation or emissions trading. In the
long term, organisations in the public, com-
mercial and industrial sectors should either
be paying a carbon tax or participating in a
trading scheme. Supplementary policies will
be required to address other barriers to en-
ergy efficiency and to achieve other policy
objectives, such as promoting renewables.
But for each target group, only a single in-
strument should be used for carbon pricing.
- Electricity: The direct approach to electricity
emissions used in the EU ETS is preferable
to the indirect approach used in a number of
national climate policies because: first, it
gives compliance obligations for electricity
emissions to the companies directly respon-
sible for the control of those emissions,
thereby incentivising both fuel switching and
energy efficiency; and second, it facilitates
cross-border electricity trade in the EU.
- Targets: Absolute targets are to be preferred
over relative targets because of their greater
environmental integrity and consistency
with the national emission targets under
Kyoto. And allowance based trading is to be
preferred over baseline and credit trading
due to its greater economic efficiency,
lower transaction costs and consistency with
the Kyoto framework. The EU ETS reflects
these considerations while many of the ex-
isting policies at the Member State level do
not. The latter should therefore be consid-
ered as transitional measures only.
- Supplementarity: There is a risk that abate-
ment in the EU ETS will be achieved
through purchasing cheap “hot air” from out-
side the scheme, rather than through domes-
tic action. But domestic abatement may be
incentivised by either restricting the interface
between the EU ETS and the international
carbon market, or by retaining (or establish-
ing) “backup” regulations for EU ETS par-
ticipants. The first approach is preferable, but
is dependent upon the final outcome of the
proposed “linking” directive. In general,
“backup” regulations should be avoided as
they are likely to undermine economic effi-
ciency, be more complex to administer and
lead to additional costs for the target groups.
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There is scope for debate over these principles
and over the specific recommendations given
in each of the case study reports. But the main
point is to encourage wider recognition of the
challenges and opportunities that the EU ETS
creates.
Notes
1) The proposed EU Emissions Trading Scheme
(EU ETS) is expected to cover some 45 % of EU
CO2 emissions from 2005 onwards. Participants
include electricity generators, oil refineries and
energy intensive manufacturing installations in
sectors such as iron and steel, minerals and pa-
per. Phase 1 of the EU ETS runs from 2005 to
2008, and Phase 2 from 2008 to 2012. As the
EU ETS expands over time to cover more sec-
tors and greenhouse gases (GHGs), the scheme
will cover an increasingly large proportion of
the total EU emissions regulated under the
UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol.
2) Further information on the INTERACT project,
including a list of downloadable reports and
policy briefs, is available on the web site:
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/environment/resea
rch/interact.html.
3) In a cap and trade emissions trading scheme for
CO2 emissions, a fixed number of emission al-
lowances are allocated each year to the partici-
pating sources. Each participant must surrender
one allowance for every tonne of CO2 emitted.
Participants who face high abatement costs can
continue to emit by buying additional allow-
ances, while participants who face low abate-
ment costs can take abatement action and sell
their surplus allowances for a profit. In this way,
each participant can minimise its overall abate-
ment costs. The scheme places an overall “cap”
on the annual quantity of CO2 emissions equal to
the number of allowances distributed, and the
trading mechanism should allow this cap to be
achieved at the lowest possible cost.
Contact
Jos Sijm
Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands (ECN)
Badhuisweg 3, NL 1031 CM Amsterdam
The Netherlands
Tel: +31 - 224 56 82 55
Fax: + 31 - 20 492 28 12
E-Mail: sijm@ecn.nl
Internet: http://ww.ecn.nl/
« »
